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Earlier this year, The Strategy Bridge asked university and professional military education
students to participate in our third annual student writing contest by sending us their thoughts on
strategy.
Now, we are pleased to present one of this year’s third-place essays by Phillip Ramirez from the
U.S. Naval Postgraduate School.
The resource-poor nations of the United Kingdom and Japan have often relied on water as a
lifeline, bringing food and raw materials to fuel their people and manufacturing bases while
serving as a conduit through which the nations can export their finished goods to eager
overseas markets. Therefore, when those life-lines were targeted by their enemies in the
World Wars using the greatest trade interdiction weapon yet created—the submarine—both
the United Kingdom and Japan were nearly immobilized. For the United Kingdom, the
German submarine threat nearly lost them both World Wars. For Japan, the American
submarine threat proved to be a decisive factor in its defeat. No two other countries have
been targeted in such a way during wartime, and no two other countries have been forced
to respond to such an existential threat from the sea.
However, while the United Kingdom and Japan experienced similar threats and had similar
strategic needs, their responses were astonishingly different. Each country’s response to the
submarine threat can be broken down into two separate but interrelated phases: first, the
degree to which each country was prepared to counter the threat to their maritime trade at
the outbreak of the war, and, second, the ability of each country to respond to the threat
once it had presented itself during the war. With respect to the first phases, the reigning
strategic doctrine at the time, namely the idea that conflicts would be decided in one
Mahanian naval battle, guided the strategic outlook of each country, massing their fleets for
battle battle as opposed to protecting the vital shipping lanes. With respect to the second
phase, it seems the United Kingdom possessed what Japan did not—an effective check on
military leaders in the form of civilian oversight of the military that both balanced the
military’s natural conservative tendencies and corrected the military when it had erred.
Ultimately, it was the delicate balance of civil-military relations that saved the day in the
United Kingdom and doomed the Japanese Empire to defeat.
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The United Kingdom in 1917
During World War I, the Germans utilized unrestricted submarine warfare in two distinct
phases: first between February and August of 1915 and again between February of 1917
and the end of the war in November of 1918.[1] The first period of unrestricted submarine
warfare ended with the sinking of the Lusitania. The second period of unrestricted
submarine warfare had its beginnings in the Battle of Jutland in 1916, after which the
German naval staff came to believe that even a decisive victory over the Royal Navy would
have little effect on the war’s outcome.[2] Therefore, in January of 1917, the German naval
staff recommended the recommencement of unrestricted submarine warfare, confident the
strategy would cripple the British war effort and force them to sue for peace before the
United States could apply its military power to the Entente’s side.[3] As such, on January
31st, 1917, the Germans declared an unrestricted war zone around the British Isles, parts of
France, and in the Mediterranean Sea.[4]
German submarine U-14 between ca. 1910 and ca. 1915 (Library of Congress/Wikimedia)
During the three months prior to the onset of this second phase of unrestricted submarine
warfare—November 1916 to January 1917—the German U-boats had managed to sink an
average of 130,000 tons of shipping each month.[5] As Arthur Marder, author of the seminal
work on the Royal Navy during World War I, notes, the numbers began to dramatically
increase, starting with the sinking of 464, 599 tons of British, Allied, and neutral shipping
(209 ships) in the month of February 1917 alone.[6] In the following two months, the
situation became even more desperate. Submarines sank 507, 001 tons of shipping (246
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ships) in March 1918 and an astonishing 834, 599 tons of shipping (354 ships) in April 1918,
much of the tonnage in the latter month being sunk between April 17th and April 30th in
what has come to be known as the “Black Fortnight.”[7]
Seeing the dramatic results of the German’s unrestricted submarine warfare campaign, the
British were forced to change their strategy to counter the German U-boats. Before April of
1917, the British had employed several unsuccessful operations to deal with the U-boat
menace: the distant blockade of the High Seas Fleet; U-boat search and destroy forces; the
dispersion of shipping, namely by sending merchant ships to sea one at a time and on
routes prescribed by the Admiralty; and the arming of merchantmen.[8] However, when the
shipping losses became too much to bear, the British admiralty decided to switch to a
convoy strategy. As Marder describes it, the convoy system is the practice of sending
merchant ships to sea in large, organized groups under the protection of one or more
warships, the idea being that the merchant ships can be more easily protected in a group
and that the group itself, in the vastness of the oceans, would be no easier to find that a
single ship. [9] Although the convoy system took time to demonstrate its value—shipping
losses in June 1917 were still high at 544, 096 tons, but this can arguably be attributed to the
slow implementation of the system—the concept paid off in the long run.[10] By November
of 1917, losses had dropped to 259, 251 tons and the British Admiralty confidently declared
“the U-boat menace ‘would be well in hand by the spring of 1918.’”[11]
The Japanese Empire from 1941 to 1945
Like the United Kingdom during World War I, when the Japanese Empire began fighting the
Allied nations in 1941, the country’s planners did not predict the eventual threat the
submarine would pose to its ability to wage war. Unlike the United Kingdom, the Japanese
did not have the convenient excuse of being the first to encounter such a threat. Despite the
haunting clear parallels, the Japanese failed to learn the lessons of British experience during
World War I. Throughout that war, the Imperial Navy was involved in escorting Entente
shipping convoys throughout the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and, at the end of the war, the
Imperial Navy even escorted convoys in the Mediterranean Sea.[12]
The Japanese situation was not helped by the fact that, even at the beginning of the war, the
country did not possess an adequate amount of shipping to keep itself fully supplied. One
estimate determined that the Japanese required ten million tons of domestic shipping to
meet their needs, but, at the outbreak of the war the country only possessed six million
tons.[13] Before the war, the remaining four million tons of shipping had to be made up by
foreign ships, mostly vessel that flew the flags of the nations against which the Japanese
had declared war.[14] This situation was compounded by the fact that the Japanese relied
on the import of raw materials and food to fuel its growing industrial base and its
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impressive war machine. Indeed, the drive for resources such as oil, tin, rubber, and iron
was one of the central reasons (if not the central reason) the Japanese declared war on the
Allied nations in 1941.
The United States’ campaign of unrestricted submarine warfare was eventually effective in
denying the Japanese their prizes from the Southern Resource Area. Japanese shipping
losses in 1942 totaled 977,927 tons, an average of roughly 81,500 tons per month.[15] In
1943, the number skyrocketed, nearly doubling to a total 1,767,642 tons, and in 1944 the
number more than doubled again, totaling 3,823,485 tons for the entire year.[16] In 1945,
the U.S. managed to sink an additional 1,809,194 tons between the start of the year and the
Japanese surrender, but by that time there was not much left to sink; the Imperial Navy was
all but obliterated and what was left of the merchant fleet was in port for repairs or
stranded there by mines.[17] While the absolute numbers seem miniscule when compared
to British shipping losses, the amount of shipping sunk relative to the amount of shipping
with which the Japanese began the war is almost incomprehensible. The Japanese began
the war with 6,384,000 tons of merchant shipping and ended it with less than a quarter of
that—1,466,900 tons.[18]
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Japanese cargo ship sinking in the Yellow Sea, off China, on 23 March 1943. Periscope
photograph, taken from USS Wahoo (SS-238), which had torpedoed her. (U.S. Navy/National
Archives)
Unprepared and Unaware: Explaining the Lack of Anti-
Submarine Warfare in the UK and Japan
What is so striking about both the British and the Japanese cases was that both countries
seemed so unprepared and unaware of the challenges the submarine might present. For
the British, this oversight is excusable. For the Japanese, it is not. However, fundamentally,
both countries relied on overseas trade to such an extent that logic would dictate that each
country should have focused on protecting their trade, presenting an interesting puzzle as
to why neither country did so. The answer to this puzzle can be found in the underlying
strategic doctrine that both the British and the Japanese, either for choice or by force,
adopted at the time.
Offensive Thought in the UK
The British Navy during World War I, whether by choice or by circumstance, became slave to
a combination of misapplied Mahanian doctrine and a bias for the offensive. By the dawn of
the twentieth century, the British had been forced to consolidate their ships around the
British Isles in response to the threat of growing German High Seas Fleet. While the British
understood the totality of Mahanian doctrine—essentially that a nation’s fleet and maritime
trade were inseparable, with the former protecting the latter and the latter strengthening
the former—the Germans did not. The Germans embarked on their massive naval
construction program at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century
with the vision of creating a fleet large enough to deter the British from entering a
continental war, or, short of that, large enough to win a decisive naval battle against them in
the North Sea.[19] This idea of the decisive naval battle has its beginnings in Mahanian
doctrine. Mahan theorized that future conflicts would be decided by a decisive naval battle
between two opposing fleets. Therefore, fleet concentration was critical; nations needed to
concentrate their fleets so that, when the time of the decisive battle came, each side would
be able to muster the full strength of their navies. While the British did not explicitly attempt
to do this, the Germans certainly did, and the British had no choice but to consolidate their
fleet to prepare for the decisive battle the Germans envisioned.
The British adherence to these ideas manifested themselves in two important ways during
the war. First the British Admiralty was reluctant to separate their destroyer escorts from
the fleet. One of the main arguments put forth by the British Admiralty against the adoption
of the convoy system was that the number of ships required to protect the convoys was far
too high and would detract from the Royal Navy’s ability to support other fleet actions,
namely the ability of the Grand Fleet to effectively fight the High Seas Fleet. Marder writes
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Admirals John Jellicoe and David Beatty (Wikimedia)
that Admirals John Jellicoe and David Beatty—the First Sea Lord and Commander-in-Chief of
the Grand Fleet, respectively
— “regarded the denuding
of the Grand Fleet still
further from its
indispensable destroyer
escort, without which it
could not move, as too
hazardous a gamble.”[20] In




convoy system and protect
the Grand Fleet. The
problem lay not in the
number of ships but in the
way in which the
appropriate number of escorts was calculated, as the British naval staff falsely believed
convoys would require two-times more escorts than were actually necessary. [21]
This incorrect calculation was also affected by the second outcome of the Royal Navy’s
adherence to misused Mahanian doctrine: the British Admiralty’s preference for the
offensive. In addition to miscalculating the number of escort vessels needed for the convoy
system, the British naval staff also accounted for the amount of escort ships needed to
continue search and destroy operations against U-boats, failing to realize that the convoy
system and such operations were alternatives not complements.[22] This demonstrates the
Royal Navy’s bias for operations they deemed offensive and distaste for operations they
deemed defensive. The British Admiralty considered patrols one of the former and convoys
one of the latter. As the late Peter Gretton, a former convoy commander himself during
World War Two and a senior research fellow at Oxford University, writes, “The patrol,
however useless it was, gave an impression of ‘doing something.’ It was considered
offensive and it gained a certain cachet.”[23]
Offensive Thought in Japan
Japanese thought before World War II was also focused on the Mahanian idea of the
decisive battle and on the cult of the offensive, but, unlike the British, the Japanese were not
forced into this situation by another major power. On the contrary, the Japanese adopted
Mahan wholesale, but, like the Germans, mistook its central lessons, concentrating on one
central element—the decisive battle. Nowhere is this more obvious than in the operations of
the Imperial Navy. From Midway to the Philippine Sea, to the sea around Saipan and the
6/18
Battle of Leyte Gulf, the Imperial Navy never gave up on the idea of the decisive battle,
allowing it to remain in their minds “until they had no navy left.”[24] As Mark P. Parillo,
Associate Professor and Kansas State University and author of The Japanese Merchant Marine
in World War II, so aptly summarizes, “The misapplied doctrines of Alfred Thayer Mahan
loomed over the Imperial Navy’s strategic thought like no other influence in its history.”[25]
This misplaced faith in the decisive battle had two effects in relation to the Japanese
response to the U.S.’s unrestricted submarine warfare, both of which contributed to the
inability of the Japanese to effectively prepare for the submarine threat. First, because of
the focus on the main battle fleet and the strength of its capital ships, the Japanese focused
their limited resources on constructing ships for the main battle fleet, diverting resources
away from civilian construction of merchant shipping. This trend was evident from the birth
of the Japanese Navy, and it seems to have been a part of the country’s rapid
industrialization. The Japanese government provided subsidies to help nurture a growing
shipbuilding industry, which had the effect of creating an impressive industry in a few
decades. Simultaneously, though, that industry became focused on naval projects as
opposed to civilian merchant ship construction, as naval contracts helped fund shipbuilding
in times of depression and never let up in boom times.[26] Parillo estimates that Japanese
shipyards were able to produce an average of 400, 000 tons of naval warships annually
during the last five full fiscal years before the war, but less than half that figure in terms of
merchant shipping.[27] Essentially, naval shipbuilding squeezed out all other types of
shipbuilding in civilian yards, leading to a gap in Japanese shipping capacity and Japanese
shipping needs.
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Super-battleships Yamato and Musashi anchored in the waters off of the Truk Islands in 1943.
(Wikimedia)
Aside from diverting resources away from projects that would positively affect the ability of
the Japanese Empire to sustain its maritime trade, the focus on the decisive battle produced
a navy that was both imbalanced and dangerously thin. Nowhere is this trend more obvious
than in the massive super-battleship projects. Each of these ships, and the Japanese built
three, took three years to construct and another two years to outfit.[28] On the other hand,
between 1941 and 1943, the Japanese did not launch a single destroyer escort.[29] This
emphasis on large capital ships affected not only production but the very ability of the
Imperial Navy to fight a sustained war at sea while simultaneously protecting its valuable
merchant fleet. Indeed, while the initial strength and capability of the Imperial Navy was
impressive, there was little to replace it with when it failed.[30] As one scholar aptly
concludes, “The Imperial navy was so finely tempered, it was brittle.”[31]
Intra-War Learning: Why the UK learned and the Japanese Lost
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It is clear from the previous discussion of the disposition and mentality of the Royal and
Imperial Navies in the years leading up to the war were not all that different. Both adhered
to what can be termed the cult of the offensive, preferring offensive action over its
defensive counterpart, and both, either through choice or circumstance, were forced to
adhere to the idea of the decisive battle. Therefore, the difference that allowed the British
to adopt an effective response to the submarine threat and the inability of the Japanese to
do so must be found in the actions that took place during the war, and indeed it is. The key
factor, which brought the British victory and the Japanese a premature defeat, was a
difference in each country’s civil-military relations.
Civilian Dominance in the United Kingdom
Until the end of April 1917, the British Admiralty was emphatic that the convoy system
would not work. Marder characterizes their main arguments against the system. First, too
many convoys would be necessary to provide support and supplies for the several different
fronts of the war. Second, vessels would be too long delayed waiting for convoys in ports,
especially those that were supposed to run on fixed schedules. Third, ports would cycle
through dearth and overload as convoys entered and exited ports. Finally, slow vessels in
the convoy would slow down faster ones.[32]
But, for each of the British Admiralty’s arguments, there was an even stronger rebuttal. Most
of the ships involved in trade were exclusively coastal traders; the actual number of ships
engaged in overseas voyages was low and could easily be escorted in convoys. Most ships
were already significantly delayed, kept in port because of U-boat sightings by patrol craft, a
state of affairs that also meant ports were either already full of ships or contained none.
Finally, the avoidance tactics that merchant ships employed on their routes were already
doubling the length of some voyages.[33] Yet, despite the logic of these arguments, the
British Admiralty obstinately remained “a conservative institution” until the bitter end.[34]
That end came with the intervention of higher powers who were able to check the
unwillingness of the Admiralty in two distinct ways: first through direct intervention on the
part of Prime Minister David Lloyd George, and second through a correction of a naval
statistical error by the Ministry of Shipping. As shipping losses continued to mount, civilian
authorities, specifically Prime Minister Lloyd George, began to take a keen interest in what
could be done to avert them. He was finally spurred into action in April when the shipping
“situation was accelerating in the wrong direction at an increasingly record rate.”[35] Indeed,
based on the figures, the British and their allies lost 881,027 tons of shipping that month
(including those losses not due to submarine activity), which represents an increase of
287,186 compared to the previous month and a change in acceleration of 233,351 tons as
compared to the previous month. In short, the situation was bad and getting worse.
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In response to the dire straits in which the country now found itself, Prime Minister Lloyd
George, on April 25th, 1917, informed the British Admiralty that he would personally visit
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David Lloyd George circa 1918 (Wikimedia)
them—a heretofore unprecedented step—on April 30th to discuss the issue of the convoy.
[36] It seems that this demonstration of authority, “the prospect of being overruled in their
The statistic in question concerned the amount of shipping that would have to be protected
by escorts in order to successfully implement the convoy system. The British Admiralty had
come to believe that the number of merchant vessels entering or leaving a U.K. port in a
single week was 5,000 and were publishing reports that said as much.[41] However, the
Admiralty was not looking at the right numbers. The 5,000 ships per week figure included
vessels that traveled along the coast and across the English Channel. When only ocean-
going vessels were counted, the number became much more manageable—120 to 140
vessels arriving and the same number leaving each week.[42] Under these circumstances,
the prospects of a convoy became much more manageable in the Admiralty’s eyes. Indeed,
Admiral Duff received these corrected statistics from an officer on his staff at the Anti-
Submarine Division, Commander Reginald Henderson, who in turn had received the
information from the Ministry of Shipping with which he had worked closely in coordinating
coal convoys from France.[43] Whether it was Prime Minister David Lloyd George or staff
members at the Ministry of Shipping, it seems clear that civilian oversight of the military
saved the day.
Military Dominance in Japan
If the United Kingdom was saved by the civilian oversight of its military, the Japanese Empire
was doomed by the lack of such oversight. That said, there is no doubt that the Japanese
would have lost World War II, even if they had managed to foresee the necessity of
developing a well-balanced navy and a merchant fleet large enough to meet their needs.
Fundamentally, Japanese strategy relied on the assumption that the German war machine
would not be stopped and the allies would therefore have no choice but to accept the
Japanese conquest as a fait accompli. Barring that outcome, the Japanese would have
gradually been overpowered by the industrial might of the United States and her allies.
Therefore, any Japanese action to improve its maritime shipping capacity during the war
would have been an effort to avert losses and to maximize efficiency in order to prolong the
war.
Such an outcome was all but closed off by the state of civil-military relations in Japan both
before and during the war. In fact, it is not outlandish to say that the traditional roles were
actually reversed. Save for the limited but revered authority of the emperor, there were no
formal checks on the military’s decision-making since the 1889 constitution did not
subjugate it to civilian control.[44] As such the military expanded into almost every facet of
Japanese decision making, both in wartime and in peacetime. Both the Army and the Navy
withheld crucial figures on warship tonnage and fuel reserves from the civilian cabinet,
preventing their civilian counterparts from gaining an accurate picture of the country’s
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situation both before and during the war.[45] In the early days of the war, the military was
able to gradually take over the country’s industrial base, assigning junior military officers as
resident inspectors, subverting the control of more knowledgeable and better qualified
government bureaucrats and plant managers.[46]
Politically, the military’s free hand was even more disruptive. Military intervention in political
affairs led to a series of assassinations and coups in the early and mid-1930s and put Japan
on the path to war. In one of the most dramatic episodes—known as the “Manchurian
Incident” —the Imperial Army invaded and occupied the Chinese province of Manchuria
completely of its own accord in 1931, forcing civil authorities to formally recognize the
occupation of the province.[47] Emboldened by their success, the Imperial Army again acted
of its own accord in the “China Incident,” beginning a full-scale war against China and setting
the stage for the Japanese war against the Allies.[48]
The complete lack of civilian checks on the military not only hamstrung what could have
been a viable avenue of reform, but led to a concurrent problem—an intense, adversarial
rivalry between the Army and the Navy. Rivalry is too weak of word; by many accounts, the
Army and Navy regarded each other as the true enemies, even during the war, going so far
as to erect defenses around their ministry buildings in case the other service tried to take
over.[49] The rivalry likely grew as a result of the ability of the military to take over certain
aspects of civilian affairs—leading to a competition between the Army and Navy as to which
one could accrue the most power—and as a result of the lack of any formal organization to
oversee the services’ operations and arbitrate their disputes.
This dynamic had a disastrous effect on the efficacy of merchant shipping. Instead of a
consolidated, efficient transportation command or ministry, each service operated its own
shipping control offices.[50] The already meager supply of escort ships and aircraft were
therefore divided between the two different shipping offices, neither of which had much
incentive to pool resources, share information, coordinate convoys, or otherwise maximize
the efficiency of the limited resources at their disposal.
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Sept. 21, 1945 in Tokyo, just after the end of the war, the people lined up are waiting for their
rations of beans, as rice was not available to them at this time. (Corbis-Bettmann/About Japan)
In any case, what limited control the Army and the Navy did exercise over shipping and
supply was not very effective. Empty merchant ships set sail to new ports to take on cargo
only to arrive and see other empty ships sailing in the direction from whence they had
come.[51] Forward progress was made only in March 1944, when the Japanese began
implementing the convoy system and building up on anti-submarine force, but by that time
it was too little, too late.[52] Other parts of the both the Army and the Navy, desperate for
equipment, appropriated what limited aircraft and ships were assigned to escort duty, and
the American submarines devastated their defenseless prey.[53] As such, the Japanese war
effort collapsed. Frontline troops went without the necessary food and supplies to make an
effective fighting force. On the home islands themselves, during the last months of the war,
hunger and starvation became the most important issues of the day, forcing the
government to devote what little shipping it had left to ferrying foodstuffs from China and
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Manchuria to the decimated Japanese Islands.[54] In the end, the Japanese were brought to
their knees by the lack of shipping. The American submarine victory was utterly and totally
complete.
Conclusion
The British and Japanese experiences with antisubmarine warfare and merchant shipping
during World War I and World War II, respectively, could not have been more different. Both
countries began their respective conflicts at a disadvantage with respect to their positions
on maritime trade protection, instead concentrating their offensive capabilities and on their
ability to bring enough force to bear to defeat the enemy in a decisive naval battle. The
effects of this unpreparedness were stark. Both countries lost enormous amounts of
merchant shipping throughout the war, and both countries were pushed to the brink of
disaster. However, only one country fell over the edge. The British were able to develop
effective tactics to stem the tide of destruction, whereas the Japanese merchant fleet was
hunted to extinction. In the end, it was the institutions of civil-military relations that made
the difference.
Civilian authorities in the United Kingdom, either through intimidation or bureaucratic
independence, were able to convince the Royal Navy to adopt the convoy system, stemming
the tide of the merchant fleet’s destruction. On the other hand, the unchecked power
accorded to the Imperial Army and Navy in Japan produced a civil government incapable of
standing up to the power of the military, forcing the civilian authorities to quietly acquiesce
to the demands of the military. In addition to the lack of effective checks that could have
forced a restructuring of the military’s antisubmarine strategy, the competition for influence
and power led to an intense rivalry between the Army and the Navy, making cooperation
between the two services on the issue of merchant shipping and escorts impossible. It was
the inability to the civil government to check the military and arbitrate between the two
services that ultimately doomed the Japanese Empire to a premature defeat.
The Japanese and British experiences with the management of their merchant shipping
during wartime and their antisubmarine warfare efforts demonstrates the importance of
installing a strong civil authority above the military. That being said, it cannot be denied that
there have been episodes in which civil leaders have hamstring military operations, risking
lives and material for the sake of politics or personal gain. But in the two largest wars this
planet has ever experienced, the authority and influence of civilians over military affairs
assured victory in one and the lack of such brought total and utter defeat in another.
Therefore, in the grand scheme of things, civil control of the military has proven its value not
only as an avenue for better governance, but as a strategic asset capable of providing the
necessary leverage to achieve victory in wartime.
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